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Anthropology has given us quite a few vital lessons. First, that the native always has the 
last word, but that there are several natives. Second, that society is a web of more or less 
systematic relationships with more or less defined boundaries. Third, that culture is a 
grid of fluid and crystallized meanings, integrated or not into a system, having just 
some autonomy vis-à-vis other cultures, which some authors claim to be irreducible. 
Fourth, not always accepted or conveyed, that changing processes are inevitable, even in 
the most stable societies and more crystallized cultures, and thus it is necessary to 
extend the analysis as far as possible, in the twofold sense of space and time, in order to 
understand how plots, dramas, and networks interconnect and develop.  
The problem is that even only somewhat integrated and stable "cultures" or 
"societies" are increasingly difficult to find in today's globalized world. Undefined 
borders, fluid cultures, soft societies, hybridity, syncretism and creolization (Stewart & 
Shaw, 1994; Clifford, 1988) are the new issues that curse the reflection of those who saw 
their own and other societies with enviable clarity, within which groups and categories 
had clear and unambiguous identities. 
Therefore, I believe I was right when I mentioned the need to understand the 
violence currently manifested in Brazil not only as a geological effect of cultural layers 
of customary violence since the colonial period, but also as part of the transnational 
crime setting that stemmed from the process of globalization with sui generis economic, 








political, and cultural characteristics that allowed a marginal or illegal business activity 
to thrive, without ceasing to be a capitalist enterprise with unrestrained pursuit of profit 
(Zaluar, 2004). Based on this fact, it is impossible to deny the need of extending the 
analysis further in order to include business crime networks across national borders, i.e., 
beyond the webs that link those who choose to live not always as outlaws, but as part of 
a peculiar mixture of legal and illegal businesses. The image of a boy from a slum 
holding a AR15 or UZI machine gun in his hand, which he considers symbols of his 
virility and a source of power and social prestige, wearing a cap inspired by the black 
movement in USA, listening to funk music, sniffing cocaine produced in Colombia, 
longing for the latest model of Nike shoes and a car of the year, all of which he becomes 
ready to kill or be killed for, cannot be explained, to say the least, only by the level of the 
minimum wage or the unemployment rate among young slum dwellers, or even less by 
backland customary violence. Understanding who delivered to him these instruments of 
power and pleasure on the one hand, and who taught him the values that drove him to 
the pursuit of pleasure and power on the other hand, are obviously issues independent 
of the local minimum wage (Zaluar, 2007) and the customary violence, both of which 
nonetheless contribute to his vulnerability and subjective formation. 
Therefore, I followed some theoretical assumptions:  
• One cannot treat the favela as an entity or a homogeneous, consensual and 
unified community. Indeed, on the contrary, there is a great diversity that segments the 
population according to gender, age, religion, income, education, profession, 
occupational position, and even social origin. Favela dwellers are largely migrants from 
other cities and states intermixed with local people – mainly with blacks who have been 
living in favelas for more than one century.  








•  The Anthropology of everyday life can no longer naively take for granted that 
individual or collective meanings are spontaneous, autonomous, with clear marks of 
popular ideology and class interests without passing through the filter of interactions 
with other political actors, including political parties and social movements, as well as 
the media and other cultural industry agents. Many actors are interacting and 
influencing each other in intricate processes of interpretation, engagement, and ideas or 
values that require renegotiations of institutions, practices, and public policies.  
• The Anthropology of the state or the margins of the state (Das & Poole, 2004) 
cannot be based on dichotomies that consider those from the poorest sectors, who live 
with precarious employment opportunities, low-quality public services, and 
vulnerability to risks (health, work, security), as if they were all equally submitted to the 
lies of governments and ignorant of the laws and the state's logic. There are several 
levels of knowledge as outcomes of different forms and levels of education, age, 
sociability networks, and political connections, as well as the discussion of binding laws 
and functions of state agents near them, including policemen. Various social movements 
may arise from this knowledge. Furthermore, one cannot consider miscellaneous 
groupings of favela dwellers, some of them migrants from several areas of urban Brazil 
but all of them legal citizens of the country, as if they were foreign immigrants or tribal 
forest people, or holders of a traditional non-occidental culture that one must consider 
in its absolute otherness.  Nor are they completely excluded, since they can at least vote 
in municipal, state and federal elections, and have access to state schools as well as the 
state universal health system (SUS) or several distributive programs, like Bolsa Família, 
Minha Casa Minha Vida etc.  
• As a more careful approach, I want to avoid the pitfalls of a new trend in studies 
of violence in Latin America that questions state legitimacy and denounces state 








violence through the embodiment of violence by terror or fear, without considering the 
effects of non-state or transnational armed criminal organizations that use terror or fear 
over unarmed people because of fragile and ambivalent institutional control. The idea of 
a “culture of terror”, a “culture of fear” or a “culture of death” is not only a sweeping 
generalization, but also a theoretical construction that implies that the body incorporates 
this culture so that one can read it from the effects it has on the bodies on which state 
violence is written. Then it becomes the ever-present space of death where “death has 
no end” (Taussig 1987, 382). The idea behind such terms is that violence is intended to 
create terror and consequently political inertia and silence among the poor, who are 
exploited, oppressed and violated people, ultimately suggesting that what is at stake is 
their bodies and not their mind, which are the mediators between their bodies and the 
outside world, where they feel and think. Nonetheless, for sociological reasoning, it is 
not the sweat, so cited by those who uphold the affect perspective, that matters for it is 
just a sign of emotion, a bodily reaction to fear linked to threats. What matters is how 
people understand and give meaning to their own sweat and other people’s sweat as 
signs of several nuances of fear that only humans are capable of, and how they deal with 
these elaborate feelings somewhat unconsciously, somewhat consciously (Turner, 2000). 
Favela dwellers do not lose their thinking and acting capacities. 
• Today, we have additional problems in avoiding the traps in which those trying 
to understand what goes on during the setup of public policies that affect various social 
agents through mass-media information. One must also avoid the arrogance of treating 
favela dwellers as alienated, deceived or "cultural idiots" produced by the media that in 
its turn is presented as a homogeneous and unison block that always fools the people. 
This dichotomy arises from others: rulers X dominated; included X excluded; white X 
black; state X social movement; Police X slum dwellers, each presented with a heavy 








load of moralistic judgments coming very close to Manichaeism, that is, of goodness 
versus absolute evil. 
• Reflexivity, an approach used by anthropologists before its more recent use by 
sociologists concerned with global issues, is not unidirectional. On the contrary, it is also 
plural, for the groupings or networks involved are various and not at all homogeneous. 
As it depends on interaction with social agents who are on the ground, and on groups 
whose conflicts and problems one tries to understand, one must admit that today they 
are far from being similar and univocal. Since we started the research in favelas with 
UPPs, I noticed that the speech of many community leaders repeated expressions and 
ideas of broader political groups outside the "communities" for which the speech was 
directed. So what can be considered as the "culture" of the favela dwellers? How are 
they linked to broader social movements, parties, and political leaders? 
Within and between slums, diversity is great. The areas with higher relative and 
absolute deprivation increase geographical mobility and contain a somewhat 
heterogeneous population, with adolescent and single mothers, youngsters outside 
school and work, traffic and militia factions, which in turn loosens social ties, decreasing 
neighborhood associations and informal social control.1 To the personal characteristics, 
as measured by census data, ecological variables should be added: the social bonds of 
trust between neighbors, the homogeneity of moral values, and institutional resources. 
For Sampson et al. (2002), several interconnected mechanisms explain the striking 
differences found between neighborhoods in the USA. First, the connection between 
concentrated disadvantage and the geographical isolation of African-Americans, or 
racial segregation as a neighborhood variable that causes the concentration of several 
																																																						
1 Women migrated to Rio de Janeiro to find better jobs, but also because they were expelled from home by their 
parents after loosing virginity or being pregnant outside marriage. This traditional culture of the Brazilian backlands 
was also much weakened in the city.  
 








social problems, such as social and physical disorder, and individual variables, such as 
low birth weight birth, infant mortality, school dropout, and child abuse, all of them 
linked also to family variables, for example households headed by women. The authors 
explicitly recognize that social capital theory contributed to understanding the 
mechanisms that were measured in different studies by the density of social ties 
between neighbors, the frequency of social interaction among neighbors, and the 
standards that make up neighboring and collective efficacy. These mechanisms, which 
refer to the willingness of neighbors to intervene protecting youths, is also dependent on 
the trust built between them. In Brazil, the concentration of these problems does not 
occur in the same way, nor is linked to racial segregation, as the favela population is 
mixed. In Rio de Janeiro, a similar study ended up with a paradox: precisely in Rio’s 
suburbs, where we find that historically and statistically there is more interaction, more 
associations, and more trust between neighbors, violence measured by the homicide rate 
is the highest in the city (Zaluar & Ribeiro, 2009). 
A third line of reflection points to the mechanism of institutional resources that 
include schools, libraries, centers for recreational activities, health centers, parent 
support and youth agencies, employment opportunities - factors that interest us greatly 
because they reveal the differences between Brazilian cities and those of other countries. 
The number of organizations in the vicinity and the participation of neighbors in these 
organizations constitute the measurement of this mechanism, according to the same 
authors. Thus, collective efficacy is linked to what Putnam (2006) called civic 
participation, clearly concurrent to public order and its institutions, still largely absent 
in government organizations that provide public services in poor neighborhoods in 
Brazil. 








Though not agreeing with the idea of a homogenous and “affected” silent 
margin, I agree that the poorer and marginalized population is the main focus of the 
system of justice in Brazil, which only now is shifting towards judicial actions against 
powerful businessmen and politicians. Even so, as always happens when prejudice and 
stereotypes of criminals predominate in the imaginary of policemen, there is a certain 
inertia in the investigation of covert networks for trafficking illegal drugs and weapons, 
besides many other mafias that control illegal businesses, even when the goods or 
services are legal, like real state business, alternative transportation, cable TV. These 
articulated networks go beyond barriers of class, urban perimeters, state and national 
borders, and encroach in legal business, in state institutions, and in governments. Since 
scholars and journalists sometimes point out the relationship between state officials and 
drug traffickers, one knows that a vast network goes upwards. But the more visible part, 
that is, the retail commerce done by the most humble of organized crime members 
located inside favelas – the “bocas-de-fumo”, has always been the preferential object of 
violent police operations called “blitz” that were common before 2008. 
There remains, thus, the difficulty of knowing the great banditry in Brazil since 
the large bandits were, till recently, not investigated, nor tried, nor sentenced with the 
same effort put on the bad guys of lesser caliber, that is the retail drug dealers. Police 
investigation about the activities of the latter is still marked by repression and by 
various manifestations of ingrained prejudices against certain categories of people, such 
as favelados, blacks, and poor youngsters, despite recent and important changes in public 
security policy. Not surprisingly, there is a lack of information for reconstituting the 
dynamics and flows of various types of organized crime, including the traffic of illegal 
drugs and guns that attracts vulnerable young people in deprived areas of the country. 








And favelados know it and are outspoken about it, reaffirming that “the policemen 
themselves bring the guns to the traffickers”.  
Therefore, some of these youths were prepared to cooperate with drug dealers 
from childhood. Children grew up in areas where the latter walked with their guns, 
gave orders, paid lavishly for fiestas and were talked about. The stories about their 
deeds were an important part of the people’s talks in the neighbourhood. Children were 
thus enticed to the drug dealers’ gang as long as the samba and football idols lost 
ascendancy over youths. They approached the latter not by carrying guns, but by going 
to buy food or carrying things between the dealers who were in different parts of the 
neighbourhood. They entered the gang later on, when they were able to show 
“disposition”, that is, mugging or killing someone with the gangs’ small guns. They 
gained status (or respect or consideration) the more guns they brought to the crew and 
the more enemies they killed, herein included policemen. Killing a cop gave them lots of 
prestige inside the crew. Therefore, there was a kind of socialization in the streets 
necessary to be accepted and respected inside the hierarchical system of power and 
prestige. These crime organizations could thus be considered a field of force with its 
own rules for establishing hierarchies between its members. The ethos or habitus was 
acquired since childhood by the example and fame of elder traffickers, and the illusion 
proper to the tacit rules and practices that they learn early and informally. Nevertheless, 
this illusion did not blind all of them, altogether, and all the time.  
At late 1980, traffickers were organized in three rival criminal factions that 
contested the territorial control of favelas, when a permanent war between them, 
supported by a systemic form of corruption of policemen, started. Then the “donos da 
boca” (owners of the selling points) joined the factions, armed all gang members as if 








they were in a gun race or a kind of “cold war” to deter their enemies, and became the 
“donos do morro” (owners of the favela or hill). 
The homicide and other violent crime rates soared in the city and the traffickers’ 
factions obtained the territory control of most favelas in Rio de Janeiro (Zaluar, 2004, 
2007). In order to gain state control over these favelas and reestablish the rule of law, a 
new security policy was developed in the city that grew out of many power disputes 
and different conceptions of policing and crime fighting. There were many challenges 
and risks in different spheres.  
This new public security policy, based on the occupation of favelas by 
Pacification Police Units (UPPs), finally started in 2008 and enabled various alliances 
and strategies between security officials and residents of pacified favelas. Although old 
tensions and secular mistrust between policemen and dwellers have not disappeared, 
this new policy was received well by most city dwellers inside and outside of favelas. 
Recently, new clashes between them reappeared, often resulting from conflicting 
interests or the police’s arbitrary acts, such as truculence and corruption still employed 
despite the project of pacification based on proximity to the residents. The complexity of 
this new kind of policing is also the result of maintaining two very different policies. 
One policy perpetuates the prerogative of law enforcement through the use of legal but 
not legitimate violence, such as checks inside homes of favela dwellers, searches inside 
their bags and backpacks. The other policy aims to community policing, that is, 
mediating conflicts, giving guidance and information about civil documents, receiving 
residents’ complaints and requests about public services.  Initially, as a way of making 
connections between them, policemen even participated in the residents’ sportive and 
cultural activities, such as playing soccer and the guitar with youths. Soon, as former 
local leaders, organizations, and long-standing neighborhood associations objected to 








this invasion of their functions, this tactic for gaining acceptance and sympathy was 
forsaken. Nevertheless, policemen working in UPPs have a dual function: on one hand, 
seizures of drugs, weapons, and arrests of persons; on other hand, supporting or 
helping dwellers with various problems.  
According to the UPP RJ site, the situation in August 2014 was the following: 38 
UPPs installed in complex of favelas since 2008, fetching 1.5 million people in 221 favela 
units that were occupied by permanent police forces engaging 9,543 policemen with a 
short training as proximity police in 9,446,047 m² of occupied area. Numbers show that 
the program progressed but say nothing about the problems, dilemmas, and challenges 
that policemen confront during the occupation for building up relations of trust and 
proximity with dwellers.  
First, one should examine the consolidated statistical data that exhibits the 
relative benefits of this new policy. Official data on deaths by intentional aggression (as 
collected from death certificates at DATASUS) published in the site Rio Como Vamos, 
reveal a striking decrease in the juvenile deaths by aggression rate at the Administrative 
Region of the Alemão Complex: 85/100,000 in 2009; 79.92/100,000 in 2010; and 
47.69/100,000 in 2011. All over the city, this source of data shows an equal drop: 115.81 
in 2009; 100.26 in 2010; and 63.74 in 2011. The local newspaper “O Globo” disclosed in 
March 24th of 2013 that there was also a spectacular fall in the amount of police gun fire: 
there were 40,332 shots fired in 2007; 53,657 in 2008; 28,484 in 2009; 23,334 in 2010; 4,244 
in 2011; and “only” 2,395 in 2012. The number is still excessive but it is more than 20 
times smaller than in 2008, when the first UPP was established at Santa Marta favela.  
Other studies point to the same tendency in the city. Zaluar and Monteiro (2012) 
showed a decrease of 40% in the mortality of people with 15 to 30 years of age that lived 








in the poorest Administrative Regions. Data from CESEC2 confirms the fall of the 
homicide rate in Rio de Janeiro (capital and state): at the capital, 45.7/100,000 in 2002 for 
22.4/100,000 in 2011, whereas, in the state, it varied from 46.6/100,000 in 2002 to 
26.3/100,000 in 2011. Although still considered excessive according to the World Health 
Organization (WHO) standards that established a 10/ 100,000 rate as acceptable, data 
showed a decrease of around half in the city and the state of Rio de Janeiro. 
More recent studies done at the Laboratório de Análises da Violência of UERJ, 
using another official source of data – homicides (registered as police incident report at 
ISP) -- during 2012 and 2013, show that homicides in 30 UPP areas decreased even more 
than in the rest of the city and state. In these areas the rates dropped 26.5% between 
2012 and 2013 (49 people murdered in “pacified” areas in 2012 and 36 in 2013), a 
tendency opposite to the one registered in the city where the rate grew 9.7% (from 1,206 
cases in 2012 to 1,323 in 2013), that is, homicides diminished more inside favelas 
occupied by UPP than in the whole city. Deaths due to confrontation with policemen 
also declined from 19 in 2012 to 12 in 2013. Recent research therefore indicates a 
reduction in the murder rate, but the number is still high considering the expected 
impact of the pacification policy. Journalists and researchers of a NGO calculated that 
7348 lives were saved between 2007 and 2013 in the state of Rio de Janeiro, considering 
the rate prevalent in 2007 and projecting it to 2013. Lives may have been saved but the 
number of murders is still far from acceptable. The present proportion of 28 homicides 
for 100,000 inhabitants is still almost three times greater than the one recommended by 
the WHO. During the first 55 days of 2014, at least 45 people were killed in police 
operations inside some favelas of Rio de Janeiro. 
																																																						
2 Available at: http://www.ucamcesec.com.br/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Homic1991_2011.jpg. 
Accessed in 24/02/2013. 
 








These modest results may be explained by the pre-electoral political context, that 
is, of an ending government, and by the protests against international events that 
happened in the city in 2014 (World Cup) and will take place in 2016 (Olympic Games). 
But one should also examine the challenges for the UPP occupation, the first of which is 
the public security institutional engineering, in which the aspects presented by experts 
as obstacles for a good running little has changed: 
I. The segregation between the police, the judicial, and the criminal enforcement 
systems, besides internal divisions in each of them, makes communication and 
cooperation among their several structures and corporations more difficult, 
provoking in its turn useless conflicts and rivalry between the public agents that 
still tend to act apart from each other; 
II.  The strategy of war against bandits and the war on drugs lingers as proximity 
policing is implemented because there was no change in the legislation and 
public policy related to the drugs defined as illegal. These are still demanded as 
source of pleasure by several sectors of the Brazilian population and are still sold 
and bought. The so-called militarization of the security policy is resultant more 
from the idea of a war against drugs and the hunt of traffickers than from the 
name “military” carried by one of the four police corporations existing in the 
country.  
III. The slight change in the Brazilian system of justice renews the preferential 
punishment of poorer criminals and the surveillance of the poorer, less educated 
and more unemployed population, especially those who inhabit the areas with 
worse public services.  
IV. A lack of a professional ethos still orients military policemen in their actions as 
enforcers of the law within public space.  








V. The reactive actions based on repression of the dispossessed still prevails over of 
investigation based on new technology and bureaucratic rationality with basic 
and clear principles, norms, and rules for all agents, that should also be known to 
those who are the object of police action.   
VI. The insufficient planning of new strategies, adopted to lessen former problems, 
and no discussion of new problems, such as post-traumatic stress, continues. The 
stress affects policemen after the deaths of colleagues as a result of traffickers’ 
shootings at the surveillance post or during battles with them. Today, daily or 
hourly provocations and death threats are addressed to them at favelas that were 
the most important emporiums of drugs and guns, such as the Complexes of 
Rocinha and Alemão.  
 
In the complex of favelas called Alemão near the city’s port and international airport, 
because armed forces occupation in 2010 ended the traffickers’ armed domain without 
arresting the majority of local drug dealers, only pushing the traffickers with police 
records towards other regions of the city, younger dealers with no criminal record and 
with less gang prestige continued to live and work discreetly there. These younger drug 
dealers could not show off guns and had to keep themselves in small alleys of the favela. 
Still, reports of clashes with policemen, armed disputes over the control of selling points 
(boca de fumo) and even territory, orders for local shopkeepers to close down their shops, 
recently became more and more common. These clashes could, in general, be considered 
a return to the initial model of illegal drug trafficking as it was practiced since the 1970s.  
Such reappearance of a prior model struck forcefully the traffickers who joined 
the factions and their practices of systematic corruption of policemen and permanent 
war with enemies. During a few decades of enduring turf war, they also developed a 








masculinity style based on the visible use of automatic and semi-automatic weapons, 
luxurious cars, modern motorcycles, and golden jewelry inside the favelas they 
dominated (Zaluar, 2004). These were the wealth symbols characteristic of hyper-
masculinity that assured them social prestige and power. Therefore, the armed control 
of entire favelas was not restricted to the use of guns but also on their display, along 
with conspicuous consumption practices that guaranteed territorial domination as well 
as the attraction of women and new soldiers for their gangs. After the UPP occupation, 
drug dealers complained mostly about losing prestige and not being able to exhibit their 
power as they used to, including the parties and funk balls they gave to impress the 
dwellers and sell drugs.  
Hence, the occupation of several favelas, especially of the Alemão complex 
located near the port and the international airport of Rio de Janeiro, generated tensions 
between traffickers, policemen and favela dwellers. Some traffickers interviewed3 stated 
they felt diminished and humiliated by the police presence where they used to thrive. 
Commercially, they were confined to the alley where they had to conform to selling 
drugs quietly and “peacefully”. Socially, in the local social networks, they were losing 
the power to attract the girls and impress the boys who admired them so much 
beforehand. Worst of all, some women started, without fear of being killed, to be lured 
by policemen who worked there every day. And the boys, that had to be replaced 
because of the high mortality rate resulting from clashes with enemy factions and with 
repressive or corrupt policemen, could become more difficult to find. 
The contingent of 9,349 new policemen employed in the UPPs till July 2014, who 
received a six-month training in proximity policing, grew too quickly during the past 5 
years. After 2013, youngsters from the inland were thus prepared to work in the capital 
																																																						
3 The NUPEVI researchers Rodrigo de Araújo Monteiro and Ana Cristina did the interviews.  
 








of the state of Rio de Janeiro, where favelas, though occupied by the Military Police, still 
sustained drug dealing. At the same time, drug dealers started to walk again with guns 
in their hands or waists, engaging in gunfire with other dealers or policemen, mainly 
inside the most lucrative favelas for drug dealing.  
Exactly at this time, several strikes and daily demonstrations began to be tailed 
with riots initiated by black blocs that hit public premises, vehicles (mainly buses), bus 
stops, newsstands and electronic banking terminals. To confront demonstrators, 
repressing them as usually done by the Military Police and its Special Operations 
Battalion (BOPE), famous for its abusive use of force, many of these new recruits, who 
received a short training in how to deal with residents by dialogue and respect, were 
engaged at this new front. They had to learn quickly the old methods of repression and 
abusive use of force at the scene. The logic of action that prevails in policemen’ 
organizational ethos became even more evident in the increasingly tense situation that 
developed in the city and its occupied favelas, which lost some policemen. Drug dealers 
smartly began to exhibit guns and drugs sold openly without hiding in the alleys where 
they stayed during the past years. According to the dispute system involving three 
factions in Rio de Janeiro, the sale outlets that showed weakness became the target of 
enemy factions. The favelas occupied by UPP were again in this game for drug dealers 
had to display powerful weapons and enlist new soldiers, essential in the deterrent 
strategy adopted to frighten enemies. Gunfire between them restarted, making 
mandatory the visible and constant use of firearms. Confrontations between policemen 
and drug dealers restarted as well, with it the “hunt to bandits” former strategy that 
includes torture and bribes sometime. At this very moment there is a struggle inside the 
Military Police to establish which modus operandi will prevail.  








After the 2013 protests, one dweller of the most important favela in the richest 
part of the city – Rocinha – was tortured and killed by policemen in the UPP led by a 
former official of the most repressive battalion of the Military Police, the Special 
Operations Battalion (BOPE). He was accused without proof of hiding guns for the 
traffickers who were still trafficking and showing provocatively their guns inside the 
“pacified” favela. Because his corpse never appeared, various protests included the 
poster: “Where is Amarildo?” This was a turning point for the UPPs since the police 
image was very much damaged. The project today is more unstable and it is necessary 
to think if and how it can follow the initial precepts and philosophy with which it 
gained the approval of the majority of city dwellers, including favelados, saving lives and 
bringing them hope.  
Furthermore, several clashes with armed drug dealers killed dozens of 
policemen, increasing even more the tension, the fear, and the stress of working inside 
the favelas. Young favela dwellers also died from gun fire, some of them accused of 
being part of drug gangs that the dwellers almost always declared innocent, others 
dying from what police identify as “stray bullets”. As a result, a new social movement 
appeared congregating the mothers of these dead youngsters and the ones sent to the 
youth justice system in which some were supposedly tortured or beaten. This 
movement has received increasing attention from the national and international press. 
Mothers are not fooled by “state lies” or silenced.  
Actually, the stories are quite different in each favela or community. And their 
specific history in building associations and in developing drug traffic as well as the 
local UPP style of handling local affairs are the keys for understanding the open 
conflicts or the cooperation between policemen and dwellers. Since favelas do not have 
the same history, since the commander style varies, since practices of officers and 








soldiers in UPPs are not homogeneous, one cannot generalize how residents evaluate 
and accept this new policing inside favelas.  
In certain favelas, dwellers’ associations, NGOs, and schools of samba 
successfully mediated the relations between UPP commander and dwellers. Some 
commanders uphold the project and are able to make rank-and-file members follow the 
rules and values of pacification and proximity. But there were several cases of failure, 
out of which came denunciations of abusive use of force, corruption, and other 
violations of dweller rights, followed by replacements of the commanders. Residents are 
not fooled by “state lies” or silenced. 
During our research in 2012 and 2013, we interviewed various UPPs in diverse 
areas of the city that expressed very different views of the project, of proximity and of 
pacification. Some of them revealed unfamiliarity or low compliance to the precepts of 
proximity policing, but one defined it as such:  
 
“When we talk about police, I remember that the term comes from the 
Greek: politia - in company of the town - the police is to preserve the 
city. Preserve the physical integrity; preserve the assets of this city, of 
this community. When the community is close to the police, it is 
integrated in order to solve its security problems; this is "proximity or 
community policing" developing together the issues that will benefit the 
community. What we want is that the residents participate in our 
activities, including our planning.” 
 
Therefore, slum dwellers, instead of just suffering, complain when respectful 








commanders are replaced and call for the urgent removal of authoritarian and corrupt 
ones. Commanders’ practices and ideas are not the same for there is no uniformity in 
their training and management of police units, probably by internal conflicts and serious 
problems within the Military Police organization, the institution responsible for 
coordinating the UPPs.  
The first attempts at making policemen and dwellers close to each other were 
sports and music lessons given by policemen. But soon there were complaints that the 
place of policemen was not in the socio-educational programs for young people because 
they tended to apply the hierarchical rules and current military discipline while 
teaching youngsters and children. Dwellers defined such tries as drills and not youth 
education. In some favelas, these projects have existed since 2000, such as Olympic 
Villas built in poor areas as a preparation for the Pan-American Games of 2007, and as a 
project for preventing violence amongst youths In others, such as Cidade de Deus, there 
were prior projects led by residents who voluntarily taught sports and music or theatre 
to children and youths for more than 40 years. These attempts stopped. 
When evaluating the UPP project, one must avoid the false consensus created out 
of a conflict situation, that is, by the forced merger of a dissident voice through the 
official and armed voice. This is especially clear in the relationship between the new 
UPP military policemen and part of the youth who rebels against their presence but are 
not silent about it. New tensions have arisen because policemen understand their 
mission also to enforce order or the laws of the country, arresting criminals on site. As 
another commander said:  
 
“What we want to do is different: that everyone knows that has to 
behave properly, with the motorcycle documents, using helmet, the 








vehicle up to date, driving license in the pocket. You cannot do 
anything wrong. You cannot have a very loud sound so as not to bother 
the neighbors, you cannot commit crime, and you cannot assault a 
woman. Everyone knows all this, and also knows that the policemen are 
present: if you do any irregularity, they are able to arrest you. Then the 
community begins to realize what works, that the law is being fulfilled. 
Beforehand, in favelas dominated by traffic, it was not possible to hold a 
marginal that was trafficking in a given locality, a marginal that had 
killed a person who just came to buy a small cocaine bag. The dealer 
was there, didn’t like the guy, killed him and ran away. How to arrest 
this marginal? How to get on the hill with hundred-odd rifles, armored 
car etc.? Not anymore, now we know that so and so killed someone, and 
the investigation will flow better, the operations will flow better so that 
policemen can hold a murderer who killed a person who was there just 
to buy a small cocaine sac.” 
 
The second challenge facing the UPP project implementation concerns the social context 
of the favelas. A survey in 20 pacified favelas of Rio created by the Institute for Work 
and Society Studies (IETS) shows that 93% of the favela entrepreneurs are self-
employed. They are small businessmen working alone as tour guides, auto mechanics, 
pubs owners, post offices informal representatives, and even Internet providers. The 
survey found an average monthly income for them of R$ 1,137.29. In Morro dos 
Prazeres, it drops to R$ 737.94, half of R$ 1,435.52, found in Chapéu Mangueira, a favela 
in the richest zone of the city. Chapéu Mangueira is surrounded by higher-income 
neighborhoods, while Morro dos Prazeres is embedded in a complex of favelas in a low-








income neighborhood. The average monthly wage of Brazilian workers is R$ 1,345, 
according to the 2010 Census. Entrepreneurship, much criticized by those who see it as a 
capitalist scheme, has helped families to find a source of income more stable than 
informal work or chores. Among the entrepreneurs, women dominate: 53%.  
During the Youth Census in ten UPPs, created in late 2013 by Pereira Passos 
Institute (IPP), 5,400 young people between 14 and 24 years old were interviewed. Of 
these, surprisingly almost 40% said they had no religion, 30% were Catholic and 27% 
Evangelical. Almost 90% of them said they had access to the Internet, 73% of which 
every day, almost 70% having access from home and 5% from lan houses or Internet 
cafes. Thus, these youngsters seem to be inserted in post modernity and able to make 
use of new ways of communicating with the wide world. However, 20% do not study or 
work or seek job, i.e. become aspirants for using illegal drugs and, worse, for being 
involved in crimes. Schooling is still a major unresolved issue, what certainly affects the 
success of UPP policy: 36% did not complete high school and only 3.6% finished 
university.  
Therefore, residents do not support the UPP project unanimously. But they all 
agree that police action alone is not the solution for violence. Some point to missed 
socioeconomic demands, others to social practices that have developed in the context of 
a relative isolation from the political and social life of the city, which we might call the 
“ghetto mentality” or a conception of a parochial space. They want to be part of the city 
with liberation from the federal laws or the urban postures of Rio de Janeiro. They want 
the benefits of urbanization without losing the advantages afforded by the informal 
economy that allows them to receive light, water, and cable TV signal paying next to 
nothing. But there is much difference between favelas previously dominated by militias 
and drug dealers who "sold" such services through the mediation of neighborhood 








associations, as well as the fees charged on all real estate transactions that occur without 
records in registry offices, only documents from the dwellers’ association that have no 
legal status outside the favela. A ghetto mentality is the result of making the favela a 
unique social order, closed in itself, outside the city, with its own "laws", refusing those 
of the urban world of which it wants to be part of. The urban and legal development of 
favelas is even presented by certain political groups as a betrayal of the “proletarian 
anti-formal-city” character of favelas. 
Some dwellers refer to favelas as “places of mishmash and disorder" that "should 
be exempted from rules", that justify a resistance to the new order, with routinely 
present police imposing limits to funk dances and noisy parties in local inns or on floor 
slabs at the top of houses. Others want and accept the proximity to the police, and 
emphasized the need for a new community ordination. Not surprisingly, young people 
sustain more the first ideas, whereas adults and the elderly, the latter.  
 
“I think there was a very good change, because earlier the children 
could not get to the street; lots of bandits were up and down the streets 
with their motorcycles, did not let the children play. We were afraid to 
let our children walk in the streets, we were afraid to let our children go 
to school because they had to go through where they were. So today we 
have no fear, we have a much better sense of security. Today I see how it 
helps, at least for me, I, a resident, I see this as an improvement like 
water into wine. The UPP police are well present, no matter the day or 
the hour, at dawn with sun or rain, we're always seeing the police 
around our house, where we lived on the main street, and I never hear a 
sound of shooting, no one screaming, fighting. None of it, because 








everything is being directed to the authority, and the real authority that 
is the power of the State, the State is doing this with its police inside the 
community. For me it is very important, and I hope they have come to 
the community to stay. I hope they do not come out anymore, that really 
pursue this state government's plan, and that they remain for a long 
time. We have been already here in the community unable to go home 
because the bandits did not allow us to pass, and now nothing of the 
kind happens, you can go in and out. Formerly the taxi driver did not 
want to leave us at the door of our house. Because formerly the offender 
aimed that people imagine the police as the enemy, then the state turned 
out to be the enemy. Every time someone was hit, the traffickers would 
close the route, put fire in cars and buses, it was wrong. Because the 
State did not act in the place where it should be the State's domain. I 
hope that the community will have more courses, more activities, that 
we can pass by a police officer and say, as I do: good morning, good 
afternoon, good evening. Some people are still afraid to speak, they are 
still oppressed. I do not, thank to God. He is here representing the state; 
the state is one of us. Instead of being repressed by so-and-so, you know 
that the state is present… But I hope they have more activities with us, 
they become closer to us for not having that atmosphere of oppression, 
of looking at the policeman and thinking: My God, what will it 
happen?” 
 
There is a clear generational conflict as well as an effect of a quite widespread fear that 
traffickers will return if the UPP project fails or the new government elected in 2014 








cancels it. There is also a tension, perhaps the most important though not the most 
evident, between the private, parochial and public spheres, the greatest of which turns 
around what would be the "public order". There is a great diversity of meanings 
attributed to the new police presence and several contradictory positions linked to what 
are the individual private freedom and the collective public spaces that should be ruled 
according to current urban postures.  
The issue is not about an attempt to regulate the local everyday life according to 
strongly invasive patterns of the residents’ privacy. Indeed, among them, there are 
various positions and divergent interests relative to the noise produced by parties and 
balls. The actual manifestation of civil rights is the demand that the rules and the time 
allowed for using public space should be discussed by the policemen and the locals.   
Another problem concerns what they call "esculacho" or the usual treatment of 
favela dwellers by the police: the invasion of households, the kicking doors by 
jackbooted policemen, or the checking of students’ bags for drugs and weapons. The 
first, just after occupation, is practiced less and less by the military forces, but the second 
became the main reason for conflicts between the police and youths of both sexes, 
particularly young males. This is now an important demand referred to individual 
rights, concerning privacy and civil rights. Because confrontations between policemen 
and drug dealers restarted in mid-2013, policemen kept the old practice of daily 
stopping youngsters to search them, leaving them humiliated and revolted. Once again 
young people are the ones who criticize the police presence by violating what they 
consider as the respect due to them. But almost all residents are aware of “esculacho” and 
deplore it. 
Dwellers are also differently connected to the former "owners of the hill”, some 
closely related or identified to the traffickers, some profiting from their presence inside 








the favela, some just having the loose relations as neighbors or kin that have always 
existed. The equation is complex because locals never uphold a unanimous acceptance 
of the traffickers’ armed presence and control. 
Though traffickers have not destroyed fully the community life in the dominated 
favelas, they have killed many independent community leaders and disorganized local 
associations. Their armed and watchful presence, classifying the surrounding favelas as 
friend or enemy, limited access to relatives, friends or mere visitors from other areas of 
the city. Local politicians, government officials, and residents from the beginning said 
that the UPP recovered the residents right to come and go, which was extended to 
outsiders and city tourists. Thus, local associations and businesses started to rely on the 
presence of increasingly frequent visitors who did not come just to buy illegal drugs. 
According to the newspaper O Globo of May 19, 2013, the cable car that serves the 
favelas in the Complex of Alemão received then 12,000 passengers per day, and on 
weekends 60% of the public would not be locals but visitors, which would indicate a 
greater number of visitors there than in other traditional sights of the city of Rio de 
Janeiro.4 
Other new problems have emerged, such as the risk of gentrification and the 
accusation that the favela was being overrun by outsiders or foreigners, as happened in 
the Vidigal favela that has the most beautiful view of the city, very close to the wealthy 
South Zone, where foreigners have been moving to live, rent or even buy  “properties”. 
In the favelas with UPPs, there was not only a reconfiguration of power relations, 
but also new leaders emerging and replacing old ones, who were submitted to the 
control of traffickers. There were also changes in the local economy with a flourishing of 
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new trades, new informal real estate transactions, and new productive organizations 
such as cooperatives of handmade products. 
Not even favela traders are unanimous about the UPP project. Among those 
heard by researchers from NUPEVI,5 many have shown great relief with the end of 
relentless shootings that "harmed the community", but especially harmed them, who 
were coerced to provide food, money or drinks to some drug dealers and their soldiers. 
Among the new problems now arising are the same complaints that plague small 
business owners or self-employed workers in the formal city: high taxes, unfair 
competition of unregulated products or itinerant trade, and irregular inspection. 
But there are merchants negatively affected by the UPP occupation, because they 
were the privileged suppliers to the parties and funk balls promoted by traffickers, 
obtaining profits from the presence, on these occasions, of drug users who were regulars 
in these dances and widely consumed illegal drugs, food, and other beverages. 
Since clashes between traffickers’ factions, and orders for closing shops and 
schools have been resumed in the larger centers of illegal drug trade, such as the 
complexes of Rocinha and Alemão, shootings with policemen restarted as well. Without 
the support of the Federal and Civil Police intelligence sector, the Military Police had to 
strengthen patrols after the attacks, returning to old practices of “bandit hunt”. The 
difficulty in fighting crime in pacified areas is also due to the lack of strategic planning 
of the intelligence sector. To make matters worse, there is corruption, lack of 
transparency in actions, and disputes between policemen. 
In our visits to the constructions made by the Federal Housing Project (PAC), we 
could observe some mismatch between the original plan and the actual uses by the 
residents. The idea of a condominium in which all residents are responsible for certain 
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costs and to maintain it clean is still absent. Problems have grown from the way popular 
housing were built and distributed, the low democratization of public spaces and a gap 
between institutions responsible for preparing the most vulnerable young people to 
become workers, entrepreneurs and citizens.  
One must also consider the links dwellers and the political power of 
representatives in the legislature and, through them or directly, to the executive power 
of the city or the state. Such connections, through go-betweens or through local 
voluntary associations and NGOs, are part of the picture one wants to understand. 
These local power settings may or may not promote, encourage or block the ability of 
neighbors to organize themselves for solving common problems. Youth socialization 
would be one of them, always linked, according to ethnographic data, with the local 
existence of elementary and high schools as well as professional courses. In some of the 
less politicized favelas, the practice of patronage via canvassers mediates the 
relationship of residents with government, making it difficult to build the social 
networks necessary for the participation of neighbors in the solutions to meet the 
common good. 
There are reports that highly placed police officers in UPPs have been sought out 
by residents to solve small everyday problems (that are part of the daily activity of any 
police institution, but do not compose its core function), and to act as mediators in 
accessing other public institutions and services. Even at an early stage, one can see that 
UPP officers begin to play the role of political and administrative mediators that 
formerly was played by neighborhood associations. It is early to say whether the latter 
have lost strength and legitimacy, both internally and externally, versus the armed 
power of traffickers and militiamen and whether they can today convey some level of 
autonomy in face of the UPP commander’s power.  








Yes, it is necessary to respect the freedom and dignity of youths, as well as of 
adult neighbors that are dealing for a long time with the most vulnerable, trying to 
prepare them to acquire the "personality capital", as well as social capital or the network 
of social relations that will make them able to overcome the challenges and obstacles 
placed to them for becoming responsible adults participating in local social life. And one 
should recognize that, all over Brazil, disadvantaged youngsters have increased their 
schooling, are now more familiar with new communication technologies, and may 
become ready to participate in the country political life. It will depend on how they will 
be received by different methods of action, if violent or destructive, if by talking about 
what is considered wrong, dangerous or unlawful. 
The growth of mugging on the streets after the UPP installation clearly points to a 
deficiency of the security policy that should bring together various government 
agencies, not just the Military Police. There was a lack, as already suggested, of 
investment in socializing programs to prevent violence and crime that ultimately kill 
them so soon, teaching civic and nonviolent coexistence. At school, it is necessary to talk 
openly about the use of psychoactive drugs and their effects, even inviting users to tell 
their experiences and what they had to face when use became abusive. It is necessary to 
discuss and expose the problems resulting from lure of money and power gained from 
the guns obtained with traffickers, including calling former dealers to talk about the 
high price paid by those who entered into what many of them call "illusion." As 
explained to me by a former drug dealer, much aware of what is going on:  
 
“So the child who is eight, nine years old, leaves school every day, gets 
home, change clothes, go to the street to play, and see all that is there. In 
a moment, he is 12, 13 years and begins to feel the needs, wanting 








clothes or sneakers, and her mother cannot afford to give him. Then he 
starts to talk "when I grow up I'll be the guy." In a little while, he drops 
out of school, leans at the retail outlet, starts at the lookout corner 
warning the approach of policemen with fireworks, until he finishes 
carrying a weapon. So, if the government invested, he would study, he 
would be training sports, be occupied. If he had at least one apprentice 
salary, he would not have time to be there all day looking at that 
banditry. He would have his money. Then, this would weaken the 
traffic. Over the following years, soldiers would lack, because soldiers 
are like wind, when one is killed another comes. But if there were brakes 
for those outside, they would not get there. Those already trafficking 
would die or go to jail and, over the years, soldiers for the traffic would 
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